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We develop a new theoretical link between inequality and growth. In our
model, fertility and education decisions are interdependent. Poor parents decide
to have many children and invest little in education. A mean-preserving spread
in the income distribution increases the fertility differential between the rich and
the poor, which implies that more weight gets placed on families who provide lit-
tle education. Consequently, an increase in inequality lowers average education
and, therefore, growth. We ﬁnd that this fertility-differential effect accounts for
most of the empirical relationship between inequality and growth.
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11 Introduction
How does the income distribution of a country affect its rate of economic growth? We
argue that to answer this question, it is essential to account for the fertility differential
between the rich and the poor. Our argument is simple: the fertility differential mat-
ters because it affects the accumulation of human capital. Assuming that we identify
human capital with education, future human capital is a weighted average of the ed-
ucation of today’s children from families in different income groups, with the weights
given by income-speciﬁc fertility rates. Poor parents tend to have many children and
provide little education. If the fertility differential between the rich and the poor is
large, more weight is put on children with little education, which lowers average ed-
ucation. The fertility differential, in turn, is a function of the income distribution. If
the differential increases with inequality, countries with higher inequality will accu-
mulate less human capital, and therefore grow slower.
We develop a growth model which captures this channel from inequality to growth.
Our model is related to Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), who analyze the effects of
public versus private education on growth in a model with ﬁxed fertility. We use
a similar overlapping-generations framework, but model endogenous fertility deci-
sions along the lines of Becker and Barro (1988). Both fertility and education are thus
chosen endogenously. Parents face a quality-quantity tradeoff in their decision on
children, and we show that education increases with the income of a family (richer
families can afford more education), while fertility decreases with income (the time
cost of child rearing is high for rich parents). The aggregate behavior of the model
depends on the initial distribution of income. Other things being equal, we ﬁnd that
economies with a less equitable income distribution have higher fertility differentials,
accumulate less human capital, and have a lower rate of economic growth. A cali-
brated version of our model with endogenous fertility choice shows that this effect is
quantitatively important and accounts for most of the empirical relationship between
inequality and growth. In contrast, if we impose fertility to be constant across income
groups, the effects of inequality on human capital and growth are small.
We also analyze the dynamic properties of the model. Since in our dynastic frame-
work a period corresponds to one generation, the dynamics of the model are to be
interpreted as changes which occur over a horizon of a century or more. Here we
2ﬁnd that the predictions of the model are similar to broad patterns of development
observed in industrializing countries in the 19th and 20th centuries. For realistic pa-
rameter values, the interaction of fertility and education decisions gives rise to non-
monotone behavior in inequality and fertility: both variables rise initially, and later
start to fall. In other words, the model generates both a Kuznets curve and a demo-
graphic transition. Thus, in addition to accounting for the cross-sectional relationship
between inequality and growth, the model generates plausible implications for the
dynamic interaction of inequality, fertility, and growth over long time horizons.
The relationships between inequality, differential fertility, and growth postulated by
the model are supported by empirical results. Kremer and Chen (2000) examine the
relationship between inequality and differential fertility. Using cross-country data,
they ﬁnd that more inequality tends to be associated with larger fertility differentials
within a country. This supports the ﬁrst part of our hypothesis, linking inequality
to differential fertility. To examine the second part of our hypothesis, the link from
differential fertility to growth, we add a differential-fertility variable to a standard
growth regression and ﬁnd large signiﬁcant effects of differential fertility on growth.
Inthe same regressions, the direct effect of inequalityasmeasured by Ginicoefﬁcients
is insigniﬁcant, once differential fertility is included.
The majority of the existing literature on inequality and growth concentrates on chan-
nels where inequality affects growth through the accumulation of physical capital
(see B´ enabou (1996)). To our knowledge, Althaus (1980) is the only existing model
that analyzes the effects of differential fertility on growth. However, in Althaus’
model fertility differentials are exogenously given, and the role of human capital is
not considered. Endogenous fertility differentials arise in Dahan and Tsiddon (1998),
but sincetheirmodel doesnot allowfor long-run growth, the analysisconcentrates on
the transition to the steady state. In Galor and Zang (1997), inequality affects growth
through its effect on overall fertility and human capital. Financial market imperfec-
tions play a crucial role in their analysis. Morand (1999) has a model of inequality
and fertility in which the sole motive for fertility is old-age support. He concentrates
on the possibility of poverty traps when the initial level of human capital is too low.
Our paper also relates to empirical studies of the growth-inequality relationship such
as Barro (2000) and Perotti (1996). Both Barro and Perotti ﬁnd that demographic vari-
ables are important for understanding the growth effects of the income distribution,
3but once again differential fertility is not considered directly.
In thefollowing section, weintroduce the model. Section 3presents theoretical results
on the quality-quantity tradeoff and the long-run dynamics of the model. In Section
4 we calibrate and simulate the model to assess the quantitative importance of the
differential-fertility channel, and to examine the implications for the dynamic evolu-
tion of inequality, fertility, and growth. Empirical evidence is discussed in Section 5,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
Consider an economy that is populated by overlapping generations of people who
live for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and old age. Time is discrete and goes
from 0 to ∞. All decisions are made in the adult period of life. People care about
adult consumption ct, old-age consumption dt
+1, their number of children nt,a n dt h e
human capital of children ht













> 0 is the psychological discount factor and γ
> 0i st h ea l t r u i s m
factor. The role of old-age consumption is to provide a motive for savings and there-
fore generate an endogenous supply of capital. Notice that parents care about both
the quantity nt and the quality ht




) of an adult’s time. An adult has to choose a consumption proﬁle ct and
dt
+1, savings for old age st, number of children nt, and schooling time per child et.








where wt is the wage per unit of human capital. We assume that the average hu-
man capital of teachers equals the average human capital in the population ¯ ht,s ot h a t
education cost per child is given by etwt¯ ht. The assumption that teachers instead of
parents provide education is crucial for generating fertility differentials. It implies
that the cost of education is ﬁxed and does not depend on the parent’s wage. Educa-
4tion is therefore relatively expensive for poor parents. In contrast, since raising each
child takes a ﬁxed amount of the parent’s time, having many children is more costly
for parents who have high wages. Parents with high human capital and high wages
therefore substitute child quality for child quantity and decide to have less children
with more education.
The only friction in the model is that children cannot borrow to ﬁnance their own
education. Instead, education has to be paid for by the parents. This assumption
is made in most studies of the joint determination of fertility and education. In the
real world, children generally do not ﬁnance their own education (at least up to the
secondary level).






+1 is the interest factor. The human capital of the children ht
+1 depends on human











Here the parameter τ
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] captures the intergenerational transmission of human




] represents externalities at the commu-
nity or society level. Alternatively, κ can be interpreted as measuring the effect of the
quality of schooling, since ¯ h is the average human capital of teachers. The efﬁciency
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The parameters satisfy B,θ
> 0a n dη
2
(0,1
). The presence of θ guarantees that par-
ents have the option of not educating their children, because even with et
= 0 future
human capital remains positive. As in Rangazas (2000), equations (3)-(4) are compat-
ible with endogenous growth for κ
= 1
￿ τ, and with exogenous growth otherwise.
We will later explore the implications of exogenous versus endogenous growth for
the long-run behavior of the economy.
Production of the consumption good is carried out by a single representative ﬁrm






where Kt is aggregate capital, Lt is aggregate labor supply, A








Human capital is distributed over the adult population according to the distribution
function Ft
(ht









and the distribution function of human capital, Ft
(h





















) is an indicator function, and it is understood that the choice variables nt and
ht





































This last condition reﬂects the fact that the time devoted to teaching is not available
for goods production. We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium for our economy:
Deﬁnition 1 Given an initial distribution of human capital F0
(h0
), an initial stock of physi-










),a n dd e c i s i o n
rules
fct, dt
+1, st, nt, et, ht
+1
g such that:
61. the households’ decision rules ct dt
+1,s t,n t,e t,h t
+1 maximize utility subject to the
constraints (1), (2),a n d(3);
2. the ﬁrm’s choices Lt and Kt maximize proﬁts;
3. the prices wt and Rt are such that markets clear, i.e., (8) and (9) hold;
4. the distribution of human capital evolves according to (6);
5. aggregate variables Pt and ¯ ht are given by (4), (5) and (7).
3 Theoretical Results
We begin the analysis of the model by characterizing the quality-quantity tradeoff
faced by individuals. We ﬁnd that education increases and fertility decreases with
income. The size of the differentials depends on the initial dispersion of human capi-
tal. To examine the long-run implications of the model, we characterize the balanced
growth path. Finally, we examine the dynamics of individual human capital as a
function of the parameters.
3.1 The Tradeoff between the Quality and Quantity of Children
The key variable for decisions in our economy is the human capital ht of a family
relative to the average human capital ¯ ht of the population. We denote the relative






For a household that has enough human capital such that the condition xt
> θ
φη





















































The second-order conditions for a maximum are satisﬁed. Note that:
∂et
∂xt




which reﬂects the well-documented fact that skilled people invest relatively more
in the quality of their children than in their quantity. The reason is that the cost of
education isﬁxed, while the time cost ofraising manychildren increaseswith income.
















For poorer households endowed with sufﬁciently little human capital such that xt
￿
8θ













Once a household is at the corner solution and the choice for education is zero, fertil-
ity no longer increases as the human capital endowment falls.
Fertility as a function of human capital is plotted in Figure 1. The horizontal part of
the relationship corresponds to the range of human capital which leads to a choice
of zero for education et. Fertility depends negatively on human capital and moves










This relationship will turn out to be helpful to interpret the role of the parameter η
and to calibrate its value.
The results derived so far reﬂect the main effects of inequality on growth that we are
interested in. Assuming that all dynasties choose positive levels of education, equa-
tion (11) shows that education is a linear function of relative human capital. If the
dispersion of human capital increases for a given average level of human capital, this
linearity implies that the average education choice will still be the same. However,
since the production function for human capital is concave in education, future aver-
age human capital will be lower if the distribution of human capital is less equal. This
would be true even iffertility were constant across families with different human cap-
ital levels. The fact that fertility is actually higher for people with low human capital
greatly ampliﬁes the negative effect of inequality on human capital accumulation.
3.2 The Balanced Growth Path
To analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy, it is useful to rewrite the equilib-
rium conditions in terms of variables that are constant in the balanced growth path.
9The capital/labor ratio kt, the growth rate of average human capital gt, the popula-



































































Prices follow from the competitive behavior of ﬁrms, which leads to equalization of















(11) and (12) otherwise. The number of children for an adult with relative human
















































































































Given initial conditions k0, ˆ h0 and G0
(x0
), an equilibrium can be characterized by
sequences
fˆ ht
+1, gt, nt, Gt
+1
(x
), Nt, xt, kt
+1
g such that (15), (16), (17), (18), (20),
(21), and (23) hold at all dates.
This dynamic system is block recursive. Given the initial conditions, we can ﬁrst use
(20) to solve for nt. Then equations (18) and (21) determine xt
+1 and gt. Leading (18)
by one period and replacing xt
+1 by its value from (21) yields an expression where gt
can be computed as a function of past variables, xt and ˆ ht. The new distribution of
relative human capital is given by equation (17). The variable ˆ ht
+1 is obtained from
(15), the aggregate population growth rate Nt from (16), and the future capital-labor
ratio kt
+1 from (23). This procedure can be used to compute an equilibrium for any
initial conditions. The future distribution of human capital is always well deﬁned
and non-negative. Given any initial conditions, an equilibrium therefore exists and is
unique.
Concerning the long-run behavior of the economy, it follows from these equations
that there is a balanced growth path in which everyone has the same human capital:
Proposition 1 If ηφ


















￿ τ (endogenous growth),
1
+ ρ otherwise (exogenous growth),















Proof: See Appendix A.
Q.E.D.
Along this balanced growth path, there is no longer any inequality among house-
holds. Thisholds because wehave assumed thathouseholds differ onlyin their initial
level of human capital. If we had introduced ability shocks on top of an unequal ini-
tial distribution ofhumancapital, inequalitywould persistalongthebalancedgrowth
path. We abstract from idiosyncratic shocks in the presentation of the model, since
they do not play a role in the channel from inequality to growth that we are inter-
ested in. However, shocks can inﬂuence the long-run dynamic behavior of the model.
Therefore we introduce ability shocks as an extension in Section 4.3 below.
We will assume ηφ
> θ from here on. We now consider the dynamics of the human
capital of an individual dynasty (of mass zero) around an aggregate balanced growth
path. This will be useful to understand the role of the parameter τ for the dynamic
properties of the model.
3.3 The Dynamics of Individual Human Capital
To study the dynamics of individual human capital, we assume that the economy is
on a balanced growth path, so that the growth rate of average human capital is con-
stant over time: gt
= g
?. We focus on the effect of the parameter τ on the dynamics of
































As shown in Appendix B, Ψ
(xt;τ
) is obtained from equation (21) after replacing
g
? and ˆ h by their steady-state values. Note that in the endogenous and exogenous
growth cases the function Ψ
(x;τ
) turns out to be the same.
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Figure 2: Steady States as a Function of τ
A detailed study of Ψ
(xt;τ
) is performed in AppendixB. A complete characterization
of the dynamics of xt as a function of the parameter τ is presented in the bifurcation
diagram in Figure 2. The steady states x are represented on the vertical axis as a
function of τ.F o r s m a l l τ there is only one steady state, x
= 1, which is globally
stable. Once τ reaches a threshold ¯ τ (given in the appendix) two additional steady
states appear. The lower one is stable and the second is unstable. This threshold
arises at the point where the cutoff value for an interior solution is a steady state of
the individual dynamics. Moreover:












) undergo a transcritical
bifurcation. There are two steady-state equilibria, 1 and ¯ x, near
(1, ˆ τ
) for each value of τ
s m a l l e ro rl a r g e rt h a nˆ τ. The equilibrium 1 (resp. ¯ x) is stable (resp. unstable) for τ
< ˆ τ and
unstable (resp. stable) for τ
> ˆ τ.







































This bifurcation occurs when an unstable and a stable ﬁxed point collide and ex-
change stability. That is, the unstable ﬁxed point becomes stable and vice versa.1
When τ increases beyond ˆ τ, the high steady state increases and then vanishes once
τ
> η. Thus, for individual dynamics to be stable, it is essential that τ be not too
high. In the next section, we calibrate the model parameters to data and ﬁnd that the
stable region for τ is the empirically relevant case. The analysis of the dynamics of
xt at given aggregate conditions is helpful to understand the numerical simulations
carried out in the next section.
4 Computational Experiments
The theoretical results in the previous section highlight two channels through which
inequality affects growth in this model. First, inequality in human capital leads to
inequality in education, and since the production function for human capital is con-
cave, inequality in education lowers future average human capital. Second, people
with lower human capital not only choose less education for their children, but also a
higher number of children. This differential-fertility effect increases the weight in the
population on families with little education, which also lowers future human capi-
tal. The question arises which effect is more important, and how large the effects are
quantitatively. To answer this question, we calibrate our model and provide numer-
ical simulations of the evolution of fertility, inequality, human capital, and income.
The main ﬁndings are that the effects of inequality on human capital accumulation
and growth are sizable, and thatthe differential-fertility effectis crucial for generating
this result.
We also use the calibrated model to analyze the dynamic implications of our theory.
Here, a key ﬁnding is that for reasonable parameterizations, the model generates a
“hump-shape” in inequality and population growth which ﬁrst increase and then fall
1Note that beyond the bifurcation point the number of ﬁxed points does not change, whereas in a
saddle-node bifurcation two ﬁxed points either appear or disappear.
14during development. This feature enables the model to reproduce broad features of
the evolution of inequality, economic growth, and population growth in industrial-
ized countries during development. This outcome lends additional support to the
relationship between inequality, fertility, and growth postulated model.
4.1 Calibration
We choose the parameters of the model such that the balanced growth path resembles
empirical features of the U.S. economy and population. The production function for
human capital is calibrated to match observed fertility differentials, as well as empir-
ical estimates of the effects of education on future earnings.
The model is calibrated under the assumption that one period (or generation) has a
length of thirty years. The parameter α is the capital share in the consumption good
sector and is set to 1/3 to match the empirical counterpart. The productivity level
A is a scale parameter and is set to A
= 1. The discount factor β mainly affects
the ratio of human capital to physical capital in the balanced growth path. Since
this ratio depends on the choice of units, it does not provide a convenient basis for
calibrating β.G i v e nt h a tβ does not inﬂuence qualitative features of the model that
we are interested in, we choose a value that is standard in the real-business-cycle
literature, β
= 0.99120 (i.e., 0.99 per quarter). The implied interest rate per year is
4.7%. The productivity growth rate ρ governs output growth in the balanced growth
path, and is set to 1.0230 or 2% per year, which approximates the average growth rate
in the U.S. With exogenous growth (i.e., κ
< 1
￿ τ) as in our calibration, the overall
productivity B in the production function for human capital is a scale parameter and
is set to B
= 1.
The weight γ of children in the utility function governs the growth rate of population
in the balanced growth path. In the U.S. as in other industrialized countries, fertility
rates are close to the reproduction level. Accordingly, we choose γ such that the
growth rate of population in the balanced growth path is zero. This is achieved by
choosing γ
= 0.271.2 The time-cost parameter φ for having a child determines the
overall opportunity cost of children. Evidence in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and
2Since convergence to the balanced growth path is slow, the model still allows for substantial pop-
ulation growth for long time periods.
15Knowles (1999) suggests that the opportunity cost of a child is equivalent to about
15% of the parents’ time endowment. This cost only accrues as long as the child is
living with the parents. If we assume that children live with parents for 15 years and
that the adult period lasts for 30 years, the overall time cost should be 50% of the
time cost per year with the child present. Accordingly, we choose φ
= 0.075. The
parameter φ also sets an upper limit on the number of children a person can have.
With our choice, a person spending all time on raising children would have a little
above thirteen children. A family of two could have a little under 27 children.3
The parameter η inﬂuences the elasticity of human capital with respect to education,
as well as the maximum fertility differential in the economy. Speciﬁcally, the max-
imum differential written as a ratio is given by 1/
(1
￿ η
). In the data set that we
use below, the highest fertility ratio between women at the lowest and the highest
education levels is 2.74 (Brazil). This differential is achieved by choosing η
= 0.635.
Our choice of η guarantees that realized fertility differentials in the model never ex-
ceed the maximum differential observed in the data, which ensures that the role of
the differential-fertility channel is not inﬂated. At the same time, for evaluating the
differential-fertility channel it is also important that the elasticity of future human
capital with respect to education is calibrated realistically. In the model, this elastic-
ity is determined jointly by η and θ.S i n c eθ enters the education choice of parents,
it determines aggregate expenditures on education. We choose θ such that in the
balanced growth path total education expenditure as a fraction of GDP matches the
corresponding value in U.S. data, which is 7.3%.4 The implied parameter value is
θ
= 0.0119. Our combined choices for η and θ imply an elasticity of human capital
with respect to education of 0.6 in the balanced growth path. This number is within
the range of estimates of the elasticity of earnings with respect to schooling. Specif-
ically, estimates of the return to an additional year of schooling range from 7.5% in
Angrist and Krueger (1991) to 12 to 16% in the study of twins by Ashenfelter and
Krueger (1994). The surveys by Psacharopoulos (1994) and Krueger and Lindahl
(2001) report estimates of the return to schooling in developed countries of 8-10%,
with higher estimates for developing countries and low levels of schooling. Assum-
3If we also modeled a goods cost of having children, the upper bound would be lower, and close to
the maximum human fertility levels observed so far.
4This ﬁgure (Digest of Education Statistics, 1998, US Department of Education) does not include
on-the-job training, since it is not part of the parental investment in children.
16ing that an additional year of schooling raises education expenditure by 20%, these
returns translate into an earnings elasticity of schooling between 0.4 and 0.8. The
elasticity implied by our parameter choices is exactly in the middle of this range.
The remaining parameters κ and τ do not inﬂuence individual decisions, but still
have an effect on growth rates. The elasticity κ of future human capital with respect
to average human capital ¯ h can be calibrated to evidence on the effects of the quality
of schooling. We interpret the education choice et as the quantity of schooling (corre-
sponding to years of schooling in the data) while ¯ h measures the quality of schooling,
since it is the average human capital of teachers. Compared to the quantity of school-
ing, the quality of schooling (such as spending per pupil at a given level of education)
has been shown to have smaller effects on earnings with an elasticity of around 0.1,
see Card and Krueger (1996) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001). In line with evidence
o nt h ee f f e c to ft h eq u a l i t yo fe d u c a t i o n ,w es e tκ
= 0.1. Alternatively, κ could also be
interpreted as a measure of human capital externalities. Existing evidence (see Ace-
moglu and Angrist 2000 and Krueger and Lindahl 2001) suggests that these external-
ities are small as well, i.e., the social return to human capital accumulation is only
slightly larger than the private return, conﬁrming our low choice of κ. Our results are
robust with respect to the choice of this elasticity in the sense that κ matters only for
the determination of the growth rate of average human capital. Individual decisions
and the evolution of inequality, fertility, and differential fertility are independent of
κ.
The parameter τ determines the direct effect of parental human capital (or, equiva-
lently, income) on the children’s human capital. Thus, τ captures the intergenera-
tional transmission of ability, as well as human capital formation within the family
that does not work through formal schooling. Empirical studies detect such effects,
but they are relatively small. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) ﬁnd that an additional
year of the mother’s education at the high school level (roughly a 10% increase in
education) raises a child’s test scores by 2.4%. Leibowitz (1974) ﬁnds that even after
controlling for schooling and education of the parents, parental income has a signiﬁ-
cant effect on a child’s earnings. A 10% increase in parental income increases a child’s
future earnings by up to 0.85%. Given that the long-run dynamics of the model are
sensitive to the choice of τ, we choose a moderate degree of intergenerational trans-
mission of human capital (τ
= 0.2) as the baseline case, and provide a sensitivity
17analysis with respect to alternative choices for τ. For individual dynamics to be sta-
ble, τ must not exceed the upper bound ˆ τ from Proposition 2. Given our choices for
the other parameters, the upper limit for τ is 0.246, which is well above the calibrated
value.
In addition to choosing parameters, we also need to set the initial conditions for the
simulations. The overall size of the population is a scale parameter which does not
affect the results, and is therefore set to one. Likewise, the distribution of physical
capital does not matter, since capital is owned by old people who have nothing left
to decide. We therefore only specify the aggregate value. The initial distribution
of human capital follows a log-normal distribution F
(µ,σ2
),w h e r eµ and σ2 are the
mean and variance of the underlying normal distribution. The parameter µ issetsuch
that ˆ ht is at its balanced-growth level. We provide simulations for different variances
of the distribution in order to examine the effects of inequality. The initial level of
physical capital K0 is chosen such that the ratio of physical to human capital is equal
to its value in the balanced growth path.5
4.2 Initial Inequality, Fertility, and Growth
As a ﬁrst computational experiment, we examine the effect of initial inequality on
growth over the ﬁrst period. Since a period is in fact a generation, the growth rate
should be interpreted as a thirty-year average. The main ﬁndings are that inequality
has a sizable effect on growth, and that most of this effect is accounted for by the
endogenous fertility differential.
Table 1 presents the initial annualized growth rates of human capital g0 and pop-
ulation N0, initial inequality I0, and the initial fertility differential D0 for different
variances of the distribution of human capital. Inequality is measured by the Gini
coefﬁcient I0 computed on the earnings of the working population. Differential fer-
tility is the difference between the average fertility of the top quintile and the bottom
quintile; this quantity is then multiplied by two to yield a number per woman. To
evaluate the role of differential fertility in our model, we also computed results un-
der the assumption of constant, exogenous fertility.
5The effectof inequality on growth is independent of µ and K0; µ and K0 only affectaverage growth
rates.
18Endogenous Fertility Exogenous Fertility
σ2 g0 N0 I0 D0 g0 N0 I0 D0
0.10 2.00% 0.00% 0.056 0.09 2.00% 0% 0.056 0
0.75 1.26% 0.66% 0.404 1.95 1.87% 0% 0.400 0
1.00 0.80% 1.08% 0.520 2.76 1.78% 0% 0.513 0
1.50 0.01% 1.71% 0.707 2.77 1.53% 0% 0.700 0
Table 1: Initial Growth with Endogenous and Exogenous Fertility
The results in Table 1 show that inequality lowers growth both with and without en-
dogenous fertility, but the effects are much larger when fertility is endogenous. When
the variance of the distribution of human capital is low (σ2
= 0.10), the difference be-
tween endogenous and exogenous fertility is small, and the growth rates are close to
their values on the balanced growth path. When we increase the initial variance to
σ2
= 0.75, substantial fertility differentials within the population begin to arise, and
the annual growth rate of human capital drops 0.74% below the steady state. With
constant exogenous fertility, the drop in the growth rate is six times smaller. Further
increases inthe initial variance eventuallylead toa negative growth rate (for σ2
> 1.5)
with endogenous fertility, while growth stays positive with exogenous fertility.
T h er e s u l t sa r er o b u s tw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ec h o i c eo fτ. For example, with σ2
= 0.75,
initial growth with endogenous fertility is 1.22% for τ
= 0.05, and 1.32% for τ
= 0.3.
With exogenous fertility, it is 1.80% for τ
= 0.05, and 1.94% for τ
= 0.3. We also car-
ried out the same computations with a uniform instead of a log-normal distribution
of initial human capital. We still found that growth declines much faster with in-
equality when fertility is endogenous. For example, when the Gini index goes from 0
to 0.33, growth drops by 0.7% with endogenous fertility and by 0.1% with exogenous
fertility.
The initial dispersion of human capital also inﬂuences the overall growth rate of pop-
ulation. When the variance of human capital rises, fertility of low-skilled households
increases, while high-skilled households decide to have fewer children. Because of
the shape of the fertility function (see Figure 1), the ﬁrst effect dominates and aggre-
gate fertility rises. This is in line with empirical studies that report a high positive
correlation between aggregate fertility rates and Gini coefﬁcients (see Barro 2000).











Figure 3: The Relationship of Inequality and Growth
Figure 3 depicts the growth rate of human capital as a function of the Gini coefﬁcient.
The slope is much steeper with endogenous fertility than with exogenous fertility.
In the data, income Ginis for a country vary roughly in the range 0.2 to 0.65. In the
model, raising the initial Gini from 0.2 to 0.65 lowers the growth rate by only about
0.3% with exogenous fertility, but by 1.4% with endogenous fertility. In a quantita-
tive sense, fertility differentials within the population are essential for generating the
relationship between inequality and growth.
We have also represented the slope of the regression of economic growth on income
Ginis run by Barro (2000) when the fertility rate variable is omitted. In this regres-
sion, the Gini coefﬁcient captures the intrinsic effect of inequality as well as the one
going through fertility. Since actual Gini coefﬁcients lie in the interval
[.21,.64
],t h e
regression line has been restricted to this interval. Our computational experiment
is consistent with the Barro (2000) ﬁnding: “A reduction of the Gini coefﬁcient by
200.1 would be estimated to raise the growth rate on impact by 0.4 percent per year.”6
Perotti (1996) reports effects of similar magnitude. Our calibrated model is therefore
able to account for most of the empirical relationship between inequality and growth.
Since the empirical estimates carry sizable standard errors, the ﬁnding does not rule
out that otherchannelscould alsoplayarole, butclearlythe differential-fertility effect
appears to be important.
4.3 The Dynamics of Inequality, Differential Fertility, and Growth
We now turn to the dynamic implications of our model. So far, we have only an-
alyzed the effects of inequality on growth during the initial period. Since in our
dynastic model a period has a length of 30 years, even the initial growth effect ex-
tends over a long horizon, and consequently the dynamics of the model are to be
interpreted as changes which occur over a horizon of a century or more. We therefore
evaluate the dynamic behavior of the model relative to the evolution of income, fertil-
ity, and inequality in industrializing countries in the last 200 years. A central feature
of the data for this period is that the behavior of population growth and inequality
is non-monotone. As a benchmark case, consider England, the ﬁrst country to in-
dustrialize. Fertility rates increased until about 1830 and started to decline rapidly
only after 1870 (Chesnais 1992). Income inequality followed a similar pattern, with
increasing inequality until about 1870 and a rapid decline afterwards (Williamson
1985). The growth rate of income per capita, in contrast, does not display a hump-
shape. Growth rates were essentially zero before the industrial revolution and then
increased slowly throughout the 19th century (Maddison 2001). Similar patterns can
be observed for Western Europe as a whole and, starting a little later, in the United
States.
To evaluate how our model performs relative to these facts, we simulate the model
6The comparison to Barro’s result is complicated by the fact that Barro conditions his estimates on
initial GDP, whereas in our simulations GDP is partly a function of the initial income distribution.
Thus, in principle, the simulations pick up the additional effect of changing initial GDP. In practice,
however, this effect turns out to be negligible. Initial GDP varies only to the extent that child-rearing
time is not included in GDP, and the resulting differences in GDP across inequality levels are small
(up to 0.3%). We computed results with an additional adjustment in average human capital that holds
GDP per worker constant across inequality levels. The results are virtually indistinguishable from the
ones reported in Figure 3.
21with the baseline calibration over a horizon of eight periods, corresponding to 240
years. The main ﬁnding is that for plausible parameters, the model can generate a
hump-shape in inequality and the population growth rate that looks very similar to
the data. This is a surprising ﬁnding, since unlike most existing theories the model
generates the pattern without requiring any exogenous change to the economic en-
vironment. We also investigate the behavior of the model if idiosyncratic shocks are
added to the production function for human capital, since for long-run analysis the
assumption thatthe onlysource ofinequalityisthe initial dispersion inhuman capital
is less attractive. We ﬁnd that adding shocks slows growth, but leaves the qualitative
behavior of the model intact. Thus our model turns out to be successful at accounting
for both the cross-sectional relationship between inequality and growth, and the dy-
namic interaction between inequality, fertility, and growth over long time horizons.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the growth rate of human capital, the population
growth rate, inequality, and differential fertility for two different values of τ.G r o w t h
rates are annualized. The initial distribution of human capital is assumed log-normal
with σ2
= 1, corresponding to an initial Gini coefﬁcient of 0.5. With a low τ of 0.05,
fertility, inequality, and differential fertility converge monotonically to their steady-
state values. Initially, inequality reduces growth below its balanced-growth value
for the reasons explained above, but subsequently the growth rate increases. Low
initial growth impliesthatthe capitalstock increasesmore slowlythaninthebalanced
growth path. Since productivity growth is exogenous, the effective capital stock falls,
and the usual transitional dynamics in exogenous-growth models result in higher
subsequent growth. If τ is raised to 0.2, the model generates the hump-shape patterns
that characterize the data. Fertility and inequality ﬁrst rise and then decrease, and
the growth rate remains below its balanced-growth value for several periods as long
as inequality remains high. A moderate degree of intergenerational persistence in
human capital is thus essential for matching the long-run evolution of inequality and
fertility to data.
The non-monotone behavior of inequality and fertility is related to the corner solu-
tion for education. A fraction of the people in the ﬁrst period decides not to invest in
education. Since this group has the highest fertility rates, their children make up an
even larger fraction of the population in the next period. If there is a sufﬁcient degree
of intergenerational persistence, these children will be at the corner solution for edu-





































Figure 4: Growth, Fertility, Inequality, and Differential Fertility for Different τ
cation as well. This leads to an increase in population growth in the ﬁrst periods and
slow growth of human capital, since investment in education is low. Because of ex-
ogenous technological change and human capital externalities, however, after a few
periods even the dynasties that initially did not invest in education ﬁnd it optimal to
start educating their children. From this point on, inequality and population growth
fall.
This non-monotone behavior only occurs if the initial distribution of human capital
is such that some people choose not to invest in education. If everyone is above the
threshold initially, convergence to the steady state is monotone even for τ
= 0.2. For
parameters that lead to an initial rise in fertility and inequality, the time paths for
inequality, growth, and fertility look surprisingly similar to the patterns of develop-
ment in Western Europe between 1800 and 2000 described by Galor and Weil (2000)
and others. For example, let us assume that t
= 1 in the graphs corresponds to the
period 1760-90 in England. Then population growth peaks around 1790-1820, and
inequality peaks 30 years later. The timing of the subsequent fall is close to what is
23observed in the data. For the hump to occur, however, τ cannot be too small, i.e., we
need some degree of intergenerational persistence in human capital and earnings.7
The main disparity between the model and the data is that in the data growth rates
were slowly increasing throughout the nineteenth century, whereas the model pro-
duces a hump-shape with ﬁrst rapidly increasing and then falling growth rates. This
behavior of the model is generated by transitional dynamics due to the exogenous-
growth assumption. We therefore alsoexplore how the model performs if we increase
the human capital externality from κ
= 0.1 to κ
= 1
￿ τ
= 0.8 to allow for endoge-
nous growth. As stressed above, individual decisions and the evolution of inequality,
fertility, and differential fertility are independent of the assumption on κ. However,
the dynamic pattern of the growth rate can be affected.8 Figure 5 compares growth
rates under the two different regimes with U.K. data from Maddison (2001). While
growth with κ
= 0.1 increases quickly and soon exceeds its balanced-growth value,
with κ
= 1
￿ τ growth converges slowly and monotonically to its long-run level. The
pattern under the endogenous growth assumption is closer to the observed pattern in
England, where the average growth rate of 2% was reached only towards the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. Notice, however, that to generate endogenous growth
we have to assume a much higher degree of externalities than suggested by empirical
estimates in recent data. The result therefore indicates that either externalities played
a bigger role in the past, or that another endogenous growth mechanism was at work
which generated the slowly increasing growth rates.
So far, we have assumed that the only source of inequality is the initial dispersion
in human capital. As a consequence, inequality is transitory in the model and disap-
pears in the balanced growth path. While this abstraction is of no consequence for the
initial growth effects, for long-run dynamics idiosyncratic shocks would be expected
7A unique equilibrium exists even if we increase τ above the bifurcation value of ˆ τ
= .246, where
we enter the region of the parameter space in which the dynamics of individual human capital are
no longer stable. The returns to parental human capital in the education function are not sufﬁciently
decreasing to compensate the centrifugal force of the quality-quantity tradeoff. Computations of the
distribution of human capital after a large number of periods indicate that an ever decreasing share
of the population accumulates an ever increasing share of human capital. The mass of people with
above-average human capital tends to zero, but the fraction of human capital accounted for by them
tends to one.
8To calibrate the endogenous growth version of the model, we keep τ at 0.2 and set κ
= 0.8. The
overall productivity B in the production function for human capital now governs the growth rate of
output per capita. We pick B
= 0.367 which ensures a long term growth rate of 2% per year.











Figure 5: Exogenous versus Endogenous Growth
to be more important. To check the robustness of our results, we therefore extended
the model by introducing idiosyncratic ability shocks in the production function for
human capital. With ability shocks, inequality persists even in the long run.
The main outcome of our simulations with ability shocks is that inequality decreases
more slowly and growth is reduced, which was to be expected, but that otherwise the
qualitative features of the transition remain intact. The quantitative impact of ability
shocks is rather small as well, provided that the shocks are calibrated to reproduce
current levels of earnings inequality in the U.S.9 Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 6,
the difference materializes only after several periods, since the ability shocks have lit-
tle additional impact as long as the distribution of human capital is widely dispersed.
In summary, we ﬁnd that our relatively simple model is surprisingly successful at re-
producing key features of the long-run evolution of inequality, fertility, and growth.
Under a moderate degree of intergenerational persistence in human capital (which
could be generated by persistence in innate ability), the model generates a hump-
shape in inequality and fertility. In order to account for slowly increasing growth
rates of income per capita, it is helpful to introduce an endogenous growth mech-
anism. While in our model endogenous growth is generated by human capital ex-
ternalities, we conjecture that similar results could be obtained with other sources of
endogenous growth.
9The ability shock is multiplicative and is drawn from a uniform distribution over
[0.9, 1.1
],w h i c h
generates a long-term Gini coefﬁcient of .35. We assume that the ability shock is uncorrelated with
parentalhumancapital,sincetheparameterτ alreadycapturesintergenerationaltransmission ofskills.



















Figure 6: Growth and Inequality with and without Ability Shocks
Our results complement existing theories of long-run growth. Relative to the liter-
ature, the main novelty is that we link the evolution of growth and population to
the income distribution. In contrast, the models developed by Hansen and Prescott
(1999), Galor and Weil (2000), and Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002) ab-
stract from distributional issues.10 We ﬁnd that allowing for inequality in human
capital combined with endogenous fertility and education choice generates realistic
predictions for inequality, fertility, and growth in a simple and natural way. Galor
and Weil (2000) generate a hump in fertility by introducing a subsistence level of con-
sumption, but the evolution of the income distribution is not explained. In Hansen
and Prescott (1999) fertility is exogenous, so neither the hump in fertility nor in in-
equality are accounted for. A limitation of our approach is that we take the initial
conditions at the start of the industrial revolution as given. For a full account of the
evolution of the economy from pre-industrial stagnation tomodern growth we would
have to add an element to the model that generates the initial stagnation phase. We
suspect that this could be done along the lines of Galor and Weil (2000) or Hansen
and Prescott (1999), but the extension is beyond the scope of the current paper.
A main implication of our dynamic analysis for the inequality-growth relationship is
that the relationship can be modiﬁed by transitional dynamics. Since inequality ﬁrst
increases and then decreases during the transition, inequality does not map one-to-
one into growth rates. In the empirical analysis, it is therefore important to control
10Doepke (2001)hasamodel of the industrialrevolution and the demographic transition which does
allow for inequality. However, since there are only two types of agents, the income distribution has
just two points. A hump in inequality arises only if there are exogenous policy changes.
26for transitional dynamics to isolate the role of the differential-fertility channel.
5 Empirical Evidence
Can the relationships between inequality, differential fertility, and growth postulated
by our model be supported by empirical evidence? The ﬁrst part of our hypothe-
sis, that income inequality leads to high fertility differentials, has been analyzed by
Kremer and Chen (2000). In line with our conjecture, they ﬁnd that Gini coefﬁcients
have a signiﬁcant and sizable positive correlation with fertility differentials. In this
section we examine the second part of our hypothesis, the link from fertility differ-
entials to growth. Our approach is to introduce a differential fertility variable into
a standard growth regression. The analysis is designed to be comparable to recent
empirical studies of inequality and growth. As predicted by our model, we ﬁnd that
differential fertility has a negative effect on growth. Moreover, when the differential
fertility variable is present, the Gini variable is no longer signiﬁcant in the regression.
5.1 Data
Our sample contains 68 countries for which data on fertility differentials is available.
The dependent variable (GR) in all regressions is the average annual growth rate of
GDP per capita over the periods 1960 to 1976 or 1976 to 1992 (the period depends on
the availability of fertility data). The GDP data is from the Penn World Tables, and
growth rates arecontinuously compoundedandexpressedaspercentages.11 Sincewe
are interested in long-run growth, we chose the longest sub-sample periods available
in the Penn World Tables.
Following Kremer and Chen (2000), for fertility differentials we rely on information
from the World Fertility Survey and the Demographic and Health Surveys on total
fertility rates by women’s educational attainment (see Jones 1982, United Nations
1987, Mboup and Saha 1998, and United Nations 1995). For countries that partici-
pated in the World Fertility Survey, the independent variable is growth in GDP per
11For countries where data from 1960 and/or 1992 was not available, we computed growth rates
over the closest available interval.
27Sample Observations Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
1960-1976 40 GR 1.95 3.65 -5.75 8.44
GINI 44.32 11.14 23.38 68.00
TFR 5.56 1.89 2.02 7.93
DTFR 2.23 1.56 0.22 5.30
1976-1992 43 GR 0.39 1.89 -3.46 4.97
GINI 45.91 9.56 28.90 69.00
TFR 6.06 1.08 3.37 8.00
DTFR 2.41 0.99 0.10 4.50
Total 83 GR 1.14 2.97 -5.75 8.44
GINI 45.14 10.32 23.38 69.00
TFR 5.82 1.54 2.02 8.00
DTFR 2.32 1.29 0.10 5.30
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
capita in the ﬁrst period, and for countries that participated in the Demographic and
Health Surveys the left-hand side variable is growth over the second period. Our
differential fertility variable DTFR is the difference in the total fertility rate between
women with the highest and the lowest education level. For some countries we have
two observations from the Demographic and Health Surveys, in which case we av-
eraged the two resulting values. For 25 countries we have only observations for the
ﬁrst period, for 28 countries we have only observations for the second period, and for
15 countries there are observations from both periods.
The remaining independent variables are initial GDP per capita (GDP), the average
ratio of investment to GDP (I/GDP), the average ratio of government expenditure
to GDP (G/GDP), the initial Gini coefﬁcient for the income distribution (GINI), a
dummy variable for African countries (AFR), and the initial total fertility rate (TFR).
I/GDP and G/GDP are from the Penn World Tables, the income Ginis are from
Deininger and Squire (1996), and total fertility rates and life expectancy (which is
used as an instrument) are from the Barro-Lee data set.12 The inclusion of initial GDP
12Where possible, the Gini coefﬁcients are from the initial year; otherwise we used the closest avail-
28and the investment ratio is important to control for transitional dynamics.
One shortcoming of the data set is that the observations on fertility differentials are
close to the end of the period over which we compute growth rates. Since the fertility
observations are ﬁve-year averages and result from decisions and actions taken even
earlier, the endogeneity problem is not too severe. We correct for potential endogene-
ity of the differentials by using instrumental variables.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in our analysis. The
two sub-samples are similar, except that the average growth rate is much lower in
the second sample. Since we will allow for different constant terms in the two sub-
samples, this difference will not play a role in the results. These will thus reﬂect cross-
sectional differences among countries, as well asvariation over time within countries.
5.2 Estimation Results
Table 3 contains our estimation results. In all cases, the left-hand side variable is the
average growth rate of GDP per capita. The regression equation is estimated with
the Generalized Method of Moments. For countries that are present in both sam-
p l ep e r i o d s ,w ea l l o wt h ee r r o rt e r mt ob ec o r r e l a t e da c r o s st h ep e r i o d s ,a n dw eu s e
instrumental variables to correct for possible endogeneity of I/GDP, G/GDP, GINI,
and DTFR. We allow the constant to differ across the periods (Constant A for the early
period and Constant B for the late period). Our regressions are designed to be compa-
rable to Barro (2000), but we include fewer variable because of the small sample size.
Regression (1) reproduces standard results in the growth regression literature: the in-
vestment rate has a positive effect, whereas the government share, initial GDP, and
the African dummy have negative effects on growth. Regression (2) adds the Gini
coefﬁcient. The estimated coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly negative, and its value is close
to Barro’s estimate. The value of the parameter implies that an increase in the Gini
of 0.4 (roughly the range of variation in the data) lowers growth by about 1.2% per
year. However, when the total fertility rate is included (regression 3), the coefﬁcient
able year. For a few countries, no data is available in Deininger and Squire (1996). For Benin, Burundi,
Central Africa, and Namibia, we relied on the “Economic Report on Africa 1999: The Challenges of
Poverty Reduction and Sustainability”, United Nations. For Haiti and Syria, only land Ginis from
(Jazairy, Alamgir, and Panuccio 1992) are available. We regressed the available income Ginis on the
land Ginis (correlation: 0.61) and used the predicted values.
29Independent Regression























































? (0.01) 0.02 (0.03) 0.06 (0.05)
ln(TFR) -1.84
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Jtest 17.71 [0.48] 17.11 [0.45] 16.79 [0.40] 9.58 [0.85]
LR1 5.53 [0.01]
LR2 2.08 [0.35]
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. The in-
struments are: constant, log of initial GDP per capita, log of initial GDP per capita squared, initial in-
vestment/GDP ratio, initial government spending/GDP ratio, initial fertility, initial fertility squared,
initial life expectancy, initial life expectancy squared, Africa dummy, and the tropics and access to the
sea variables of Sachs and Warner (1997).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. These are based on the heteroscedastic-consistent
covariance matrix of Newey-West. One star indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, two stars indicate signif-
icance at the 5% level.
Jtest is the test for over-identifying restrictions of Hansen (1982), asymptotically χ2 distributed
with n degrees of freedom, where n is the number of over-identifying restrictions. Corresponding
p
￿values are reported in brackets.
LR1 is a quasi-likelihood ratio test for the absence of the differential fertility in the equation. LR2
is the test for the absence of both Gini and total fertility. As suggested by Gallant (1987), they are
computed as the normalized difference between the constrained objective function and the uncon-
strained one. The constrained estimation is computed with the weighting matrix provided by the
unconstrained estimation. The corresponding p
￿values are reported in brackets.
Table 3: Generalized Method of Moments Estimation
30Independent Regression
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant A 9.88 (10.1) -6.70 (17.5) -3.31 (18.8) 6.72 (19.9)
Constant B 7.95 (10.1) -8.48 (17.4) -4.77 (18.6) 479 (19.7)
ln(GDP) -0.65 (2.73) 4.65 (4.12) 2.37 (4.09) 1.39 (4.26)



























GINI -0.13 (0.22) 0.31 (0.27) -0.18 (0.37)
ln(GDP)*GINI/100 -0.01 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05)
ln(TFR) -2.20








as in Table 3.
Table 4: GMM Estimation with Squared GDP and Cross Effects
31on the Gini coefﬁcient changes sign and becomes insigniﬁcant, which is also in line
with Barro (2000).
Regression (4) includes the differential-fertility variable. The coefﬁcient on differen-
tial fertility is signiﬁcantly negative. The point estimate implies that an increase in
the fertility differential from one to two would lower growth by 0.8% per year. With
differential fertility included, the coefﬁcients on both Gini and TFR are insigniﬁcant,
and the point estimate on the Gini is positive.
Based on the results in Section 4, our model predicts that Gini, total fertility, and dif-
ferential fertility should all be equally negatively related to growth. It is therefore not
clear why the coefﬁcients on the Gini and the total fertility rate become insigniﬁcant
once differential fertility is introduced. One possibility is that inequality and total
fertility are inﬂuenced by other factors which do not affect growth, while differen-
tial fertility is observed with less noise. A second possibility is that total fertility and
inequality have other effects on growth, which are not present in our model and do
not work through differential fertility. If some of these effects on growth are positive
and therefore offset the negative effects, it would be plausible that the overall effect of
total fertility and the Gini becomes insigniﬁcant once the differential-fertility channel
is controlled for.
Hansen’s J-test measures how close the residuals are to being orthogonal to the in-
strument set. It can be seen as a global speciﬁcation test. The degrees of freedom
equal the number of restrictions imposed by the orthogonality conditions. These re-
strictions are never rejected at the 5% level. Moreover, there is a large improvement
in the value of the test when differential fertility is introduced. The signiﬁcance of
the differential fertility variable is veriﬁed both by its t-statistic and by the quasi-
likelihood ratio test LR1.T h et e s tLR2 of joint insigniﬁcance of GINI and TFR is not
rejected.
Barro (2000) argues that there are important non-linear effects that relate the levels of
development and inequality to growth rates. He shows that unless these nonlinear
effects are addressed, the effects of inequality and fertility on growth are difﬁcult to
distinguish. To check whether our ﬁndings are robust with respect to the inclusion
of non-linear terms, we add a squared term for GDP per capita and an interaction
term involving GDP and inequality to the explanatory variables. Table 4 presents
the results. The new terms are never signiﬁcant and do not affect the signiﬁcance
32of the J-tests. Given our relatively small number of observations, the inclusion of
additional variables lowers the signiﬁcance of the other variables. In particular, the
Gini coefﬁcient is now never signiﬁcant, but total fertility is signiﬁcant in regression
(3). Our main conclusion remains: when differential fertility is added in regression
(4), it is signiﬁcant, while total fertility is not. Differential fertility again improves the
value of the J-test.13
In summary, we ﬁnd that standard growth regressions detect the effect of differential
fertility on growth postulated by our model. The effects implied by the regressions
are sizable. At the same time, including differential fertility leaves the direct effect of
the Gini coefﬁcient insigniﬁcant, with a positive point estimate.
6 Conclusion
Most of the theoretical literature on inequality and growth has concentrated on chan-
nels where inequality affects growth through the accumulation of physical capital.
In this paper we propose a different mechanism which links inequality and growth
through differential fertility and the accumulation of human capital. In our model,
families with less human capital decide to have more children and invest less in edu-
cation. When income inequality is high, large fertility differentials lower the growth
rate of average human capital, since poor families who invest little in education make
up a large fraction of the population in the next generation. A calibration exercise
shows that these effects can be fairly large. In the benchmark case, raising the Gini
from 0.2 to 0.65 lowers the initial annual growth rate by 1.4%. We also examine the
role of differential fertility in the growth-regression framework used, among others,
by Perotti (1996) and Barro (2000). In line with the predictions of the theory, we ﬁnd
sizable negative effects of differential fertility on growth. Both the empirical results
and the quantitative analysis of the model suggest that the differential-fertility chan-
nel is important for accounting for the cross-sectional relationship between inequality
and growth.
13Asan additionaltest ofthe robustness ofour results, we alsocarriedout regressionswith initial life
expectancy as an explanatory variable. Growth regressions generally show life expectancy to be more
closely related to growth than other demographic variables such as the total fertility rate. However,
even if we add life expectancy to regression (4) in Table 3, differential fertility continues to have a
signiﬁcantly negative effect on growth, albeit with a lower point estimate of -0.79.
33We also examine the time series implications of our model for the joint evolution of
inequality, fertility, and growth. Since in our overlapping-generations model a pe-
riod is one generation, the dynamics of the model are to be interpreted as changes
which occur over a horizon of a century or more. Here we ﬁnd that the model is able
to explain key features of the evolution of income, fertility, and inequality in indus-
trializing countries in the last 200 years. Speciﬁcally, the model generates an initial
increase and ultimate decline in inequality and fertility. The same pattern has been
observed in many industrializing countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In
addition, if we specify the model to allow for endogenous growth, the model gen-
erates steadily increasing growth rates throughout the transition, which is another
stylized feature of the data.
Our analysis provides a new perspective on the link between economic growth and
population growth. Existing studies have found little correlation between the growth
rates of population and output per capita (see Kelley and Schmidt 1999), which has
led some researchers to conclude that population does not matter for growth. The
results in this paper suggest that it is not overall population growth, but the distri-
bution of fertility within the population which is important. In other words, who is
having the children matters more than how many children there are overall.
A natural direction for further research concerns the policy implications of our model.
Since differential fertility rather than inequality per se is the main source of growth
effects, it is not clear that redistributional policies would increase economic growth.
Indeed, a typical outcome in models with endogenous fertility is that income redistri-
bution tends to increase fertility differentials (see Knowles 1999), which would lower
the growth rate. Here the policy implications of our model are in stark contrast to
other theories linking inequality and growth. Compared to income redistribution,
policies aimed at equalizing access to education would be more effective.
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37A Proof of Proposition 1
Case κ
= 1













































































































solve equations (16), (17), (18), (20), (21) and (23).
B Analysis of the Individual Transition Function
































? and ˆ h
? are the balanced-growth-path values. In the case κ
= 1



































Both substitutions lead to the same expression, i.e. equation (24) of the main text. The expres-




































































Hence the function Ψ starts from
(0,0
) with an inﬁnite slope and goes either to
￿∞ or
+∞
depending on parameter values.
By deﬁnitionof theaggregatebalanced growthpath, x





























) undergo a transcritical
bifurcation, as proved in Proposition 2. There are thus two steady-state equilibria, 1 and ¯ x,
near
(1, ˆ τ
) for each value of τ smaller or larger than ˆ τ. The equilibrium 1 (resp. ¯ x)i ss t a b l e
(resp. unstable) for τ
< ˆ τ and unstable (resp. stable) for τ
> ˆ τ.
Another point of interest is xt
= θ
ηφ. If, at this point, the function Ψ is negative, it crosses the
horizontal axes between 0 and θ
ηφ. The existence of this steady state results from the inﬁnite





















































We are now able to fully characterize the dynamics of x as a function of the parameter τ.T h e
bifurcation diagram is presented in Figure 2.
39